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the	 context	 of	 four	 jurisdictions:	 Scotland,	 Canada,	 the	Netherlands	 and	 South	
Africa.	What	 is	 striking	 is	 how	 different	 is	 the	 process	 of	 reaching	 a	 resolution	
in	 each	 jurisdiction,	 though	 the	actual	 result	might	be	 the	 same.	This	difference	
arises	 because	 of	 the	 jurisdiction-specific	 reasons	 why	 same-sex	 marriages	 and	
unions	 are	 recognized,	 how	 they	 are	 recognized,	 the	 status	 of	 the	 officers	 who	
preside	over	the	relevant	services,	and	the	historical-legal	place	of	religion	in	each	
jurisdiction.	 Against	 these	 backgrounds,	 reasonably	 similar	 arguments	 relating	
to	 discrimination	 and	 accommodation	 are	 raised,	 but	 play	 out	 differently	 given	




du	 même	 sexe,	 une	 question	 survient	 quant	 au	 sujet	 du	 droit	 des	 officiants	
présidant	à	ces	unions	de	refuser	d’y	participer	pour	des	raisons	religieuses.	Cet	
article	 examine	 la	 question	 dans	 quatre	 pays:	 l’Écosse,	 le	 Canada,	 les	 Pays-Bas	
et	 l’Afrique	 du	 Sud.	 Bien	 que	 chaque	 juridiction	 résout	 cette	 question	 par	 un	
processus	différent,	la	solution	retenue	est	semblable.	Ces	approches	différentes	sont	
dues	aux	circonstances	nationales	particulières	quant	aux	raisons	pour	lesquelles	
les	mariages	 et	 unions	 entre	 personnes	 du	même	 sexe	 sont	 reconnus,	 comment	
ils	sont	reconnus,	le	statut	des	officiants	qui	y	président	ainsi	que	le	rôle	légal	et	
historique	 de	 la	 religion.	Dans	 ces	 contextes,	 des	 arguments	 semblables	 reliés	 à	
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I.  Introduction
The	 issue	 of	 whether	 same-sex	 couples	 should	 be	 able	 to	 enter	 into	marriage	 or	 an	 equivalent	 institution	 has	 been	 addressed	 in	 many	jurisdictions	 in	 the	 past	 two	 decades.	 Those	 legal	 systems	 that	 have	
either	created	some	form	of	legally-recognized	same-sex	partnership	or	opened	
the	existing	institution	of	marriage	to	such	couples,	have	each	faced	difficult	











This	 article	 compares	 the	different	 attempts	 at	 resolving	 this	 conflict	 in	
four	jurisdictions:	the	Netherlands,	South	Africa,	Scotland,	and	Canada.	The	
primary	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	analyze	both	the	nature	of	the	complexities	
which	 arise	 in	 each	 jurisdiction	 as	 they	 attempt	 to	 resolve	 the	 conflict,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 using	 arguments	 concerning	 discrimination	 and	












law,	which	may	carry	 less	 legal	weight,	but	may	be	more	 influential	 in	 the	
lives	of	a	greater	proportion	of	the	population.	Our	chosen	jurisdictions	are	all	
places	where	there	is	legal	acceptance	of	homosexuality5	(decriminalization,	
protection	 from	 discrimination,	 relationship	 recognition)	 despite	 having	
5	 	We	deal	only	with	what	might	be	called	“traditional”	homosexuals:	gay	men	and	lesbians.	Going	beyond	
these	categories	would	of	course	add	yet	another	layer	of	complexity	to	the	study.
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differing	 degrees	 of	 social	 hostility	 towards	 it.	 They	 are	 all	 places	 where,	
because	of	 immigration	or	political	changes	or	both,	there	is	some	social	or	
political	flux	 in	progress.	As	well,	 the	 jurisdictions	are	sufficiently	different	
so	 as	 to	 generate	 questions	 about	 the	 ability	 to	 transport	 legal	 analyses	 or	
solutions	to	such	socio-legal	issues	across	jurisdictions.	
The	specific	legal	system	in	each	jurisdiction	is	in	fact	different:	a	common	




within	 a	 system	of	 family	 regulation	 that	 seeks	 to	 avoid	discrimination	on	
the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.	The	basic	concepts	are	often	the	same	but	the	
history	 of	 legal	 developments	 affecting	 this	 issue	 is	 quite	 different	 in	 each	
jurisdiction.	 The	way	 in	which	 homosexuality	 and	 religious	 expression	 or	
ideas	 are	 legally	 protected	 in	 each	 jurisdiction	 is	 different.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	
the	 legal	 issue	 concerning	 the	accommodation	of	 each	must	be	 resolved	 in	
harmony	with	other	historical	legal	developments	in	the	given	jurisdiction.	
To	a	certain	extent,	 then,	 this	paper	 is	a	critique	of	 the	assumption	 that	
legal	solutions	to	these	(and	similar)	issues	can	simply	be	transported	across	
borders	to	somewhat	similar	jurisdictions.	The	underlying	issues	that	make	
this	 simple	 transport	 complicated	 or	 impossible	 will	 be	 evident	 from	 the	
discussion	here.	A	signal	service	of	comparative	analysis	is	to	problematize	easy	
and	adoptive	solutions,	however	the	main	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	investigate	




Our	primary	 concern	 is	not	 the	 ability	of	 religious	officials	 to	 refuse	 to	
conduct	 same-sex	marriages	within	 their	 religious	 institutions	 or	 contexts.	
We	 accept	 (and,	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 not	much	disputed)	 that	 religious	 institutions	
are	 entitled	 to	 conduct	 (or	 not	 conduct)	marriages	 according	 to	 their	 own	
tenets	and	doctrines.	We	focus,	rather,	on	civil	servants	(or	their	equivalents)	
who	 act	 as	 marriage	 officers	 and	 who	 object	 to	 participating	 in	 the	 legal	
institutionalization	of	same-sex	unions.
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II.    Background: The Religious Associations of Marriage
Marriage	 is	 an	 institution	 laden	 with	 symbolism	 and	 deep	 social	
importance.	 	Though	 the	historical	 association	of	 religion	 in	 the	 institution	
of	marriage	 is	 common	 in	 each	 of	 the	 jurisdictions	 being	 considered	 here,	
there	are	different	assumptions	about	the	degree	to	which	religious	ideology	






the	 one	where	 religious	 bodies	 have	 least	 influence	 over	 the	 institution	 of	
marriage.	This	is	probably	due	to	the	fact	that	Calvinism,	the	major	religious	
tradition	 in	 the	 country,	 did	 not	 regard	 marriage	 as	 a	 sacrament,	 but	 as	
primarily	 a	 secular	 issue.	Marriages	 officiated	 by	 religious	 representatives	
lack	 legal	 effect	 and	 religious	 weddings	 prior	 to	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	 civil	
legal	marriage	are	forbidden.	A	religious	representative	who	performs	such	
a	premature	religious	wedding	may	be	criminally	sanctioned.8	Nevertheless,	
marrying	 couples	 often	 have	 religious	 ceremonies	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	
the	 civil	 ceremony.	Despite	 this	 long	 history	 of	 secularization	 of	marriage,	
providing	religious	marriages	with	legal	effect	has	been	frequently	debated	
and	 re-considered,	most	 recently	 in	 2001.9	Although	 secular	 authority	 over	
the	 institution	 of	 marriage	 has	 prevailed,	 the	 wish	 to	 reintegrate	 religion	


















periods	when	marriage	was	 concluded	only	by	 secular	 authorities.	Mostly,	
and	with	small	variations	between	the	four	territories	and	states	which	would	
eventually	 form	South	Africa	 in	1910,	marriages	could	be	concluded	either	










although	 these	 marriages	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	 lower	 status17	 than	 civil	
marriages	 in	 terms	of	 the	Marriage	Act,	1961.	Many	of	 the	explicitly	 Judeo-
Christian	 features	of	civil	marriage	have	since	been	removed	and	therefore	
civil	 marriage	 can	 no	 longer	 simply	 be	 equated	 with	 religious	 marriage;	
however,	 some	 religious	overtones	 remain,	 such	as	 the	 insistence	 that	 civil	
marriage	must	be	monogamous.	In	fact,	the	creation	of	separate	legislation	to	
cater	for	same-sex	marriage	is	arguably	motivated	by	the	desire	to	maintain	




















and	 South	Africa.	 The	 reason	 was	 that,	 after	 the	 Reformation,	 canon	 law	
remained	the	 law	of	 the	 land	except	 insofar	as	 it	was	 inconsistent	with	 the	
reformed	 faith,	 and	 no	 such	 inconsistency	 was	 perceived	 in	 continuing	
the	 tradition	 of	 church	 ministers	 solemnizing	 marriages.	 Marriage	 could	
be	 solemnized	 in	 Scotland	 only	 by	 religious	 ceremony	 until	 1940,	 when	
the	Marriage	 (Scotland)	 Act	 1939	 came	 into	 force,	 permitting	 civil	marriage	
celebrated	 by	 a	 secular	 state	 official,	 in	 addition	 to	 religiously	 conducted	
marriage.18	 	 The	 dominant	 Church	 of	 Scotland’s	 (“the	 Kirk’s”)	 doctrinal	




the	 French-speaking	 (largely	 Catholic)	 and	 the	 English-speaking	 (largely	
Protestant)	provinces,	over	the	role	of	religion	in	marriage	and,	particularly,	
divorce20	 was	 so	 fundamental	 that	 it	 influenced	 Canada’s	 constitutional	
division	 of	 powers	 in	 1867.21	 The	 result	 is	 that	 the	 federal	 government	
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III.    The Institutionalization of Same-Sex Unions
Each	 of	 the	 four	 jurisdictions	 under	 consideration	 here	 has	 in	 the	 past	
couple	 of	 decades	 dealt	 with	 demands	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 same-sex	
relationships	within	a	wider	context	of	providing	legal	recognition	to	family	
formations	outside	of	traditional	marriage.	As	a	result	of	the	different	 legal	
and	 social	 contexts	within	 these	 jurisdictions,	 there	have	been	 significantly	
varied	responses	to	these	demands.	
A.	The	Netherlands
The	 Netherlands	 introduced	 legally-recognized	 registered	 partnerships	
for	both	same	and	opposite-sex	couples	 in	1998.24	Other	 than	having	 fewer	






impetus	 for	a	proposal	 to	 re-introduce	 legally-effective	 religious	marriages.	
GroenLinks,	a	left	wing	“green”	party,	proposed	to	lift	the	ban	on	marriages	
conducted	by	 religious	officials	 so	 as	 to	 accommodate	orthodox	Christians	








huwelijk	 en	 de	 Wet	 geregistreerd	 partnerschap	 in	 opdracht	 van	 het	 Ministerie	 van	 Justitie	 [Marriage	 or	
Registered	Partnership?:	An	Evaluation	of	 the	Act	Opening	Civil	Marriage	 to	Same-Sex	Couples	and	
the	Act	 Introducing	 Registered	 Partnership,	 Commissioned	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice]	 (The	Hague:	
Ministerie	 van	 Justitie,	 2006);	Kees	Waaldijk,	 ed,	More	 or	 Less	Together:	 Levels	 of	 Legal	Consequences	 of	
Marriage,	Cohabitation	 and	Registered	Partnership	 for	Different-Sex	 and	 Same-Sex	Partners:	A	Comparative	












By	 way	 of	 contrast	 to	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	 same-sex	 couples	 are	
fully	 included	 in	 the	 institution	of	marriage,	 in	 Scotland	marriage	 remains	
the	 exclusive	 preserve	 of	 opposite-sex	 couples,	 while	 same-sex	 couples	




institution	of	marriage	 that	 remains	exclusively	 for	opposite-sex	couples.	 30	
Civil	partnership	may	be	equivalent	to	marriage,	but	it	is,	quite	intentionally,	
an	entirely	secular	institution.	So,	for	instance,	registrars	do	not	“solemnize”	
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sex	marital	 regime.33	 This,	 in	 turn,	 resulted	 in	 national	 legislation	 opening	
marriage	to	same-sex	couples.	
C.	South	Africa
The	 South	 African	 Civil	 Union	 Act,	 2006	 allows	 for	 the	 solemnization	
of	 civil	unions	between	 two	same-sex	or	opposite	 sex	partners,	 either	by	a	
religious	institution	or	by	a	state	official.34	The	provisions	relating	to	the	place	
and	 formalities	 for	 the	solemnization	of	 civil	unions	mirror	 those	applying	
to	marriage.	Additionally,	at	the	time	of	solemnization	the	“marriage	officer	




Thus,	 civil	 unions	 are	 institutions	 that	 share	 all	 of	 the	 characteristics	 and	
consequences	of	marriage;	they	can	even	be	registered	as	a	marriage,	though	
the	 existing	 marriage	 regime,	 which	 is	 limited	 to	 opposite-sex	 couples,	 is	
retained,	albeit	rather	clumsily.
D.	Canada
Before	 the	 adoption	 in	 2005	 of	 the	 Canadian	 Civil	 Marriage	 Act,	 two	
provinces	had	introduced	civil	unions	as	equivalent	institutions	to	marriage.38	
The	Civil	Code	 in	Quebec	was	amended	 in	2002	 to	create	 the	status	of	 civil	
union,	open	to	same-sex	and	opposite-sex	couples	and	mirroring	the	rights	


























civil	marriage	 to	 same-sex	 couples	and	by	 the	2005	 federal	 statute.	Typical	
of	the	reasons	in	the	court	cases	are	those	from	the	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal.	
The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	exclusion	of	same-sex	couples	from	marriage	
“denies	persons	 in	 same-sex	 relationships	 a	 fundamental	 choice	 –	whether	










of	 marriage	 in	 Canada	 does	 not	 differentiate	 between	 religious	 and	 civil	






of	 partnerships.	 South	Africa	 retains	 opposite-sex	 only	 marriage,	 but	 also	
has	civil	unions,	which	are	open	to	same	or	opposite-sex	couples	and	which	
may	be	called	marriage	if	the	partners	so	wish.	Only	in	Scotland	is	there	no	
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IV.    Conducting Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Marriages
A.	The	Netherlands
In	 the	 Netherlands	 secular	 marriage	 ceremonies	 and	 the	 registration	
of	 registered	partnerships	 are	 the	 tasks	 of	 civil	 servants	who	work	 for	 the	
Registrar’s	 Office	 (Burgerlijke	 Stand);	 however,	 in	 practice	 the	 ceremonial	
part	of	the	marriage	is	often	conducted	by	people	who	may	or	may	not	work	














civil	 servants	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 employed	 by	 58	different	municipalities;	
however,	72%	of	the	municipalities	have	indicated	that	they	are	not	willing	
to	 countenance	 these	 objections	 (so-called	 weigervrije	 gemeenten)	 and	 234	
municipalities	hire	new	servants	only	on	condition	 that	 they	are	willing	 to	
perform	all	marriages.46








45	 	See	 e.g.	 the	website	of	 the	municipality	of	Staphorst:	 “Buitengewone	ambtenaren	burgerlijke	 stand”	
[Special	Officials	Registry],	 online:	Gemeente	 Staphorst	<http://www.staphorst.nl/index.php?simact








That	 is	 to	 say,	 such	 acts	 typically	 belong	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 legislator	 or	
the	administration,	comparable	to	the	levying	of	taxes.	Such	acts	have	been	
deliberately	 left	outside	of	 the	scope	of	 the	equal	 treatment	 legislation	 that	
focuses	on	relationships	between	citizens,	and	not	between	the	government	
and	its	citizens.	So,	couples	will	usually	not	know	that	an	official	refused	to	
marry	 them	because	 they	 apply	 to	 the	municipality,	which	 in	 turn	 assigns	
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registrars	 available	 to	 conduct	 civil	 partnerships	 throughout	 the	 country.51	
The	 local	 demand	 for	 registrars	 who	 will	 conduct	 civil	 partnerships	 and	
marriages	is	assessed	by	the	local	authorities,	who	must	ensure	that	there	are	
enough	 registrars	 so	 authorized	 in	 their	 area	 to	meet	 the	demand.	Despite	
calls	 for	 it	 to	do	so,	 the	Civil	Partnership	Act	2004	contains	no	conscientious	











In	 Canada,	 the	 provinces	 have	 different	 regimes	 relating	 to	 the	
appointment	of	people	who	can	conduct	same	or	opposite-sex	civil	marriages.	
There	 are	 also	 different	 names	 for	 the	 individuals	 authorized	 to	 perform	
them.55	 Different	 solutions	 were	 adopted	 by	 the	 different	 jurisdictions,	
regarding	the	issue	of	refusing	marriage	commissioners.56	Some	decided	that	












55	 In	 Ontario,	 for	 example,	 judges,	 justices	 of	 the	 peace	 and	municipal	 clerks	 can	 perform	marriages,	






56	 These	 solutions	 generally	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 informally	 and	 not	 always	 consistently	 adopted.	 See	
Bruce	MacDougall,	“Refusing	to	Officiate	at	Same-Sex	Civil	Marriages”	(2006),	69	Sask	Law	Rev	351,	at	
fn.	11.
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the	 basis	 of	 religion	 or	 conscience.57	 Still	 others	 took	what	might	 be	 called	
a	middle-ground	approach	and	permitted	opt-outs	only	where	the	marriage	










The	 Canadian	 federal	 Civil	 Marriage	 Act	 does	 not,	 for	 constitutional	










In	 South	 Africa,	 the	 Marriage	 Act,	 1961	 dictates	 that	 marriages	 can	
be	 performed	 either	 by	 religious	 officials	 or	 by	 public	 servants,	 who	 are	
automatically	 deemed	marriage	 officers	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 occupation.60	 In	
addition,	marriages	can	also	be	conducted	by	officers	of	certain	religions	who	
have	been	appointed	as	marriage	officers	by	the	State.61	Religious	marriage	
officers	may	 object	 to	 conducting	marriages	which	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 the	
tenets,	 doctrines,	 or	 disciplines	 of	 their	 religions.62	 For	 instance,	 Catholic	
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marriage	officers	may	object	to	conducting	marriages	between	persons	who	
have	 been	 divorced,	while	 certain	 Jewish	marriage	 officers	 could	 object	 to	
conducting	marriages	 between	 Jews	 and	 non-Jews.	 Conversely,	 no	 similar	
conscientious	objection	provision	exists	for	public	officials	who	are	marriage	
officers,	 therefore	 they	must	conduct	all	marriages,	 regardless	of	 their	own	
beliefs.
The	 position	 is	 different	 for	 civil	 unions	 in	 South	Africa.	 In	 respect	 of	
religious	marriage	officers,	the	Civil	Union	Act	requires	first,	that	a	religious	




have	 statutory	 rights	 of	 conscientious	 objection	 on	 theological	 grounds.64	
This	contrasts	with	 the	position	of	 religious	marriage	officers	who	conduct	









institution	 and	 the	 individual	 marriage	 officer	 must	 apply	 to	 conduct	





the	sexual	orientation	of	 the	couple.	For	 instance,	a	 Jewish	marriage	officer	







64	 Ibid,	 s	 6.	 See	 also	 Elsje	 Bonthuys,	 “Irrational	 Accommodation:	 Conscience,	 Religion	 and	 Same-Sex	
Marriages	in	South	Africa”	(2008)	125:3	SALJ	473	[Bonthuys,	“Irrational	Accommodation”].
65	 	Marriage	Act,	1961,	supra	note	12,	s	31.
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Turning	 to	 civil	 servants	 conducting	 civil	unions,	 they	“may	 in	writing	
inform	the	Minister	that	he	or	she	objects	on	the	ground	of	conscience,	religion	
and	 belief	 to	 solemnizing	 a	 civil	 union	 between	 persons	 of	 the	 same	 sex,	
whereupon	 that	marriage	officer	 shall	 not	be	 compelled	 to	 solemnize	 such	
civil	 union.”66	 The	 only	 ground	 upon	 which	 they	 can	 object	 is	 the	 sexual	
























held	 in	Fitzpatrick	 v	Sterling	Housing	Association	Ltd	 that	 a	 same-sex	 couple	
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partner	to	inherit	the	tenancy	held	by	the	deceased	partner.	70	The	House	of	






After	 a	 long	hesitancy	 from	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	 (the	
“European	 Court”)	 to	 accept	 that	 same-sex	 couples	 represented	 an	 aspect	
of	 family	 life	 as	well	 as	private	 life,	 that	Court	has	now	firmly	established	
that,	just	like	legal	differences	based	on	sex,	legal	differences	based	on	sexual	
orientation	 may	 be	 justified	 only	 by	 particularly	 serious	 and	 persuasive	









as	 does	 domestic	UK	 law.74	 Both	 the	 European	Court	 itself	 and	 the	British	
domestic	 courts	 take	 a	 robustly	 secularist	 approach	 to	 the	need	 to	 balance	
religious	freedoms	with	the	demands	for	equality.	Munby	J	put	it	thus:	
[I]t	is	important	to	realise	that	reliance	upon	religious	belief,	however	conscientious	




Laws	 LJ	 elaborated	 upon	 this	 with	 a	 classically	 secular	 judgment	
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organization’s	services	to	same-sex	couples.	His	argument	that	this	amounted	




faith,	 however	 long	 its	 tradition,	 however	 rich	 its	 culture,	 is	 deeply	unprincipled;	
it	 imposes	compulsory	law	not	to	advance	the	general	good	on	objective	grounds,	
but	to	give	effect	to	the	force	of	subjective	opinion	…	The	promulgation	of	law	for	







The	 Dutch	 Constitution	 contains	 an	 explicit	 prohibition	 against	




direct	 discrimination	 is	 not	 allowed	 on	 any	 of	 the	 enumerated	 grounds,	
unless	 the	 law	explicitly	provides	 for	an	exception.	 Indirect	discrimination,	
on	the	other	hand,	may	be	objectively	justified.	The	objective	justification	test,	
developed	 by	 the	 European	Court	 of	 Justice,	 demands	 that	 discrimination	
must	serve	a	legitimate	government	purpose	and	that	the	means	to	achieve	
this	purpose	are	both	appropriate	and	necessary.	Despite	the	fact	that	sexual	





the	 basis	 of	 religion,	 article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 Dutch	Constitution	 also	 determines	
that	“[e]veryone	shall	have	 the	 right	 to	profess	 freely	his	 religion	or	belief,	
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responsibility	 under	 the	 law.”81	 Whereas	 protection	 against	 discrimination	
depends	on	comparison,	freedom	of	religion	can	be	regarded	as	an	autonomous	





The	 constitutional	 position	 in	 Canada	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 in	 the	







of	 the	 Charter	 is	 section	 1,	 the	 so-called	 “reasonable	 limits”	 clause	 which	
determines	that	“[t]he	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms	guarantees	
the	 rights	and	 freedoms	set	out	 in	 it	 subject	only	 to	 such	 reasonable	 limits	
prescribed	by	law	as	can	be	demonstrably	justified	in	a	free	and	democratic	
society.”85	 This	 means	 that	 discrimination	 may	 be	 justifiable	 in	 particular	
contexts,	 similar	 to	 the	Dutch	provision.	 Furthermore,	 s.	 33	 of	 the	Charter,	
termed	 the	 “notwithstanding	 provision”,	 permits	 governments	 to	 override	





By	 1995,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 came	 to	 accept	 that	 it	 was	
unconstitutional	to	discriminate	against	gay	and	lesbian	couples	on	the	basis	
















exclusion	of	members	of	 same-sex	 couples	 from	 the	definition	of	 “spouse”	
in	 Ontario’s	 Family	 Law	 Act,88	 thus	 excluding	 them	 from	 spousal	 support	
claims,	 was	 an	 infringement	 of	 section	 15’s	 equality	 provisions.	 Such	 an	
infringement	was	 found	not	 to	 be	demonstrably	 justified	under	 s.	 1	 of	 the	
Charter.	 Though	 worded	 within	 a	 different	 constitutional	 framework,	 the	
principles	underpinning	this	decision	are	the	same	as	those	identified	by	the	
UK’s	House	 of	Lords	 in	 the	 cases	 of	Fitzpatrick	 and	Ghaidan.	 The	 Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	in	M	v	H	held	that	a	denial	of	the	potential	benefit	of	a	spousal	
support	claim,	possibly	imposing	a	financial	burden	on	a	member	of	such	a	
same-sex	 relationship	 that	 a	member	 of	 an	 opposite-sex	 couple	would	 not	
have,	“contribute[d]	to	the	general	vulnerability	experienced	by	individuals	
in	same-sex	relationships.”89	The	majority	stressed	that	“[b]eing	in	a	same-sex	








the	 amendments	made	 by	 this	Act	 do	 not	 affect	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	
‘marriage’,	that	is,	the	lawful	union	of	one	man	and	one	woman	to	the	exclusion	
of	all	others.”91	The	court	cases	on	same-sex	marriage,	referred	to	earlier,	put	






















the	 latter	 right	 “may	 not	 be	 exercised	 in	 a	 manner	 inconsistent	 with	 any	
provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights.”96
VI.     Responses to Objecting Marriage Officers in the  
          Different Jurisdictions
In	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Scotland,	 which	 lack	 conscientious	 objection	
provisions,	the	issue	of	objecting	marriage	officers	has	nevertheless	surfaced	
in	 the	 indirect	guise	of	 employment	discrimination	 claims.	Employees	 and	







VII. Claims of Employment Discrimination
In	 the	 UK,97	 the	 Employment	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 (the	 “EAT”)	 has	 twice	








97	 Both	cases	about	 to	be	discussed	are	English,	but	 the	employment	 legislation	and	 the	discrimination	
provisions	at	issue	are	common	across	the	jurisdictions	that	make	up	the	United	Kingdom	(including,	of	
course,	Scotland).
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contrary	to	their	own	personal	views.		In	McClintock,98	a	Justice	of	the	Peace	
who	 sat	 in	 family	 cases	 asked	 to	 be	 relieved	 from	 dealing	 with	 adoption	




“cherry	pick”	which	 laws	 to	apply	and	which	 to	 refuse	 to	deal	with.99	The	
EAT	did	not	directly	address	 the	 issue	of	 sexual	orientation	discrimination	
because	 the	 claimant	 based	 his	 argument	 on	 the	 supposed	 clash	 between	
the	 Civil	 Partnership	 Act	 2004	 and	 the	 obligation	 under	 the	 Children	 Act	
1989100	to	treat	the	welfare	of	the	child	as	the	paramount	consideration.	This	
argument	was	dismissed.101	The	principle	in	this	case	was	not	limited	to	those	






civil	 partnerships	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 to	 do	 so	would	 be	 inconsistent	with	
her	 “orthodox	Christian”	beliefs,	 and	particularly	her	belief	 in	 the	 sanctity	
of	 marriage.103	 She	 was	 disciplined	 and	 threatened	 with	 dismissal,	 which	
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The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	there	was	no	direct	discrimination	against	
Ladele	because	the	Council’s	actions	were	a	response	to	her	refusal	to	carry	
out	 civil	 partnership	duties	 and	not	 a	 response	 to	 her	 religious	 beliefs.	As	
well,	it	held	that	there	was	no	indirect	discrimination	because	the	Council’s	
(legitimate)	aim	was	not	only	to	ensure	that	all	couples	who	wished	to	register	
a	 civil	 partnership	 had	 access	 to	 a	 registrar	who	would	 do	 so,	 but	 also	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	Council	acted	consistently	with	 its	 stated	policy	of	fighting	
discrimination	 against	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 citizens	 and	 employees.	 The	Court	




the	Court	 held	 that	 the	 council’s	 policy	 of	 requiring	 all	 of	 its	 registrars	 to	
perform	civil	partnership	duties	was	a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	its	
aim	of	providing	a	non-discriminatory	public	service,	notwithstanding	that	
some	 other	 councils	 might	 not	 impose	 this	 requirement	 on	 its	 registrars.	
Indeed,	the	Court	was	willing	to	contemplate	that	councils	could	not	lawfully	
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The	first	Dutch	case	on	the	issue	concerned	a	special	civil	servant	whose	
fixed	term	contract	was	not	renewed	because	she	was	unwilling	to	officiate	
at	 same-sex	marriages.111	The	official	 argued	 that	 this	 amounted	 to	 indirect	
discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion.	 The	 CGB	 accepted	 the	 indirect	
discrimination	 argument	 and	 found	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 special	 civil	
servant	 was	 not	 objectively	 justified.	 It	 opined	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	 very	






to	 settle	 the	 issue.	 First,	 in	 2006,	 there	 was	 a	 motion	 to	 oblige	 all	 newly	
appointed	marriage	officials	to	officiate	all	at	forms	of	marriage;	however,	this	
motion	was	 rejected.112	 In	2007,	a	new	government	 included	 in	 its	 coalition	
agreement	a	statement	that:	“marriage	officials	with	conscientious	objections	
are	 allowed	 to	 excuse	 themselves	 from	 officiating	 same-sex	 marriages	 on	












112	 	Netherlands,	Tweede	Kamer,	Kamerstukken	 II,	Vergaderjaar	2005-2006,	 27	017	Homo-empancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	17	“Motie	van	het	lid	Timmer	cs”	[Motion	by	Member	of	Parliament	
Timmer	cs]	(13	April	2006).
113	Coalitieakkoord	 tussen	 de	 Tweede	 Kamerfracties	 van	 CDA,	 PvdA	 en	 ChristenUnie	 [Coalition	 Agreement	
Between	CDA	(Christian	Democrats),	PvdA	(Labour)	and	CU	(Christian	Union)]	(7	February	2007),	online:	
<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2007/02/07/
coalitieakkoord-balkenende-iv/coalitieakkoord-cda-pvda-cu-tcm149-92516.pdf>	 at	 37	 [translated	 by	
author].
114	 “Vrijheid	 en	 verantwoordelijkheid:	 Regeerakkoord	 VVD-CDA”	 [Freedom	 and	 Responsibility:	
VVD-CDA	 Coalition	 Agreement]	 (7	 October	 2010),	 online:	 Kabinetsformatie	 2010	 <http://www.
kabinetsformatie2010.nl/Documenten_formatie_2010>.
115	 	See	eg	“Wetgeving	staat	weigerambtenaren	toe”	[Law	Allows	Officials	to	Refuse]	(19	April	2007),	online:	
Art	 1	 <http://www.art1.nl/artikel/7568-Wetgeving_staat_weigerambtenaren_toe>	 (legal	 research	
assigned	by	the	Dutch	national	association	on	discrimination,	Art.	1,	an	NGO).
116	 	Decision	No	2008-40	(2008),	(CGB),	online:	<http://www.cgb.nl/oordelen/oordeel/215285/volledig>.	











Unfortunately,	 this	 solution	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 clear	 or	 settled.	 The	
deputy	minister	 responsible	 for	gay	emancipation	policies	announced	 that,	
according	to	her,	municipalities	should	be	allowed	to	accommodate	objecting	
officials,	on	condition	that	there	is	another	civil	servant	available	to	perform	
same-sex	 marriages.117	 In	 reaction,	 members	 of	 parliament	 have	 requested	
that	 the	government	 formally	end	the	practice	of	accommodating	objecting	
officials.118	The	consequences	of	the	holding	of	the	European	Court	in	Schalk	





The	South	African	Civil	Union	Act	 is	 still	 relatively	new	and	 there	have	
been	 no	 legal	 challenges	 against	 the	 conscientious	 objection	 provision.	
Nevertheless,	it	has	been	suggested	that,	at	the	very	least,	the	peculiar	way	in	
which	this	provision	accommodates	religious	objections,	as	described	above,	
fails	 to	meet	 the	 standards	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation.119	A	 related	 case	
was	recently	heard	by	the	Equality	Court	in	terms	of	the	Promotion	of	Equality	
Act.120	 The	 case	 of	 Strydom	 v	 Nederduitse	 Gereformeerde	 Gemeente	 Moraleta	
117	Netherlands,	 Tweede	 Kamer,	 Kamerstukken	 II,	 Vergaderjaar	 2010-2011,	 27017	 Homo-emancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	76	 “Brief	van	de	Minister	van	Onderwijs,	Cultuur	 en	Wetenschap”	
[Letter	of	the	Minister	of	Education,	Culture	and	Science]	(24	May	2011).
118	 	Netherlands,	 Tweede	 Kamer,	 Kamerstukken	 II,	 Vergaderjaar	 2010-2011,	 27017	 Homo-emancipatiebeleid	
[Homosexual	Emancipation],	No	77	“Motie	van	het	lid	Van	Gent	cs”	[Motion	of	Member	of	Parliament	

















rights	 to	 equality	 and	 freedom	 from	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sexual	
orientation	against	the	impact	upon	religious	freedom,123	which	would	result	
from	failing	 to	grant	 the	church	an	exemption	 from	the	anti-discrimination	
legislation,	the	Court	found	in	favour	of	Strydom.
In	 Canada,	 within	 jurisdictions	 which	 oblige	 marriage	 commissioners	
to	marry	all	couples,	some	marriage	commissioners	have	resigned	in	direct	
response	 to	 the	obligation.	There	have	been	at	 least	 two	sets	of	 complaints	
launched	by	affected	marriage	commissioners	in	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan,	
with	all	initial	decisions	being	against	the	marriage	commissioners.124
Out	 of	 all	 of	 the	 countries	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	 only	 complaint	














124	 	These	 cases	 are	discussed	 in	Geoffrey	Trotter,	 “The	Right	 to	Decline	Performance	of	 Same-Sex	Civil	
Marriages:	The	Duty	 to	Accommodate	Public	 Servants;	A	Response	 to	Professor	Bruce	MacDougall”	
(2007)	70:2	Sask	L	Rev	365	at	390-91.	See,	in	Manitoba,	Kisilowsky,	File	No	04	EN	462	(Manitoba	Human	
Rights	 Commission);	 and,	 in	 Saskatchewan,	 three	 cases	 before	 the	 Saskatchewan	 Human	 Rights	
Tribunal:	Bjerland	v	Saskatchewan	(Department	of	Justice)	(2006),	CHRR	Doc	06-888;	Goertzen	v	Saskatchewan	


























beliefs.	 In	 the	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	 the	Court	unanimously	held	















154  n  Canadian Journal of Human Rights                    (2012) 1:1 Can J Hum Rts






























against	 homosexuals,	 because	 of	 its	 general	 message	 that	 discrimination	
of	 homosexuals	 is,	 at	 the	 least,	 tolerable	 (while	 discrimination	 based	 on,	





orthodox	Christians	 take	 either	 the	 view	 that	 one	 should	 accept	 the	 consequences	 of	 ones’	 religious	
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Nevertheless,	 a	pragmatic	 solution	may	be	mandated	by	 the	 constitutional	
duty	of	reasonable	accommodation	of	religious	beliefs.	That,	however,	shifts	
the	question	to	what	would	amount	to	reasonable	accommodation.
A	 focus	 on	 discrimination	 against	 lesbians	 and	 gay	men	 usually	 leads	








Nevertheless,	 this	right	 is	generally	subject	 to	other	public	policy	concerns,	

















be	no	delay	 resulting	 from	 such	 a	 refusal,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	mere	 fact	
that	an	official	officiates	only	at	opposite-sex	marriages	cannot	be	qualified	
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Marriage	or	registration	officers	who	refuse	to	be	involved	in	the	creation	
of	 marriages	 or	 civil	 unions	 involving	 same-sex	 couples	 argue	 that	 the	
failure	 to	provide	 them	with	a	right	 to	refuse	constitutes	discrimination	on	


















objectors	does	not	 result	 in	discrimination	on	 the	 basis	 of	 religion	because	





The	 Saskatchewan	 Human	 Rights	 Tribunal	 has,	 for	 instance,	 held	 that	 a	
marriage	 commissioner	 appointed	 to	 perform	 purely	 secular	 marriage	
ceremonies	is	a	part	of	“government”	for	constitutional	purposes.138	
It	has	been	argued	that	it	is	an	“illiberal	notion	that	persons	performing	
public	 functions	must	 leave	 their	 conscientiously	held	beliefs	 at	 home	and	









  MacDougall et al, Conscientious Objections to Creating Same-Sex Unions  n  157
has	for	a	long	time	not	been	regarded	as	central	to	many	religious	traditions.	
If	that	is	the	case,	then	civil	servants	would,	as	a	result	of	this	interpretation,	
not	 be	 required	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 ceremony	 of	 religious	 significance,	 but	
merely	 to	perform	an	administrative	act.140	Moreover,	 civil	 servants	do	not,	
by	officiating	at	same-sex	marriages,	become	themselves	parties	to	same-sex	
sexual	 relationships	or	acts,	 i.e.	 they	do	not	engage	 in	homosexuality;	 they	
simply	engage	in	a	function	that	accords	status.	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that	
officiating	at	a	same-sex	civil	ceremony	is	consistent	with	and	conforms	to	the	











for	 the	 existence	 of	 direct	 discrimination,	 indirect	 discrimination,	 or	 no	
discrimination	at	all.	It	is	probably	most	accurate	to	characterize	governments’	
requirements	 that	 all	 marriage	 officers	 conduct	 same	 and	 opposite	 sex	
marriages	 as	 having	 a	 more	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 those	 who	 believe	 that	
their	 religions	 forbid	 them	 to	 officiate	 at	 such	 marriages	 –	 i.e.,	 indirect	
discrimination.	This	does	not,	however,	 end	 the	 inquiry,	 since	 the	question	
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If	 one	 accepts	 that	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 freedom	 of	 religion	 should	
be	 balanced	 against	 equality	 interests	 of	 the	 same-sex	 couples,	 many	
contradictory	 arguments	 present	 themselves.	 First,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	
direct	discrimination	–	by	the	marriage	officers	against	same-sex	couples	–		is	
more	objectionable	than	the	indirect	discrimination	against	marriage	officers.	
This	was	 at	 issue	 in	 a	CGB	decision	 in	 the	Netherlands	which	 involved	 a	






The	 CGB	 solved	 the	 problem	 in	 a	 pragmatic	 way	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	
student	refrain	from	shaking	the	hands	of	both	men	and	women.	Although	







the	 refusing	 official	 or	 even	 know	 that	 someone	 refused	 to	 marry	 them,	
provided	 an	 agreeable	 marriage	 officer	 was	 available.	 In	 other	 words,	 is	
awareness	of	indirect	discrimination	more	serious	than	unawareness	of	direct	
discrimination?	 Nevertheless,	 even	 in	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 could	 be	
argued	 that	 same-sex	 couples’	 awareness	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 government	
accommodates	 objections	 against	 same-sex	 marriage	 generally	 (while	 not	
accommodating	 objections	 to	 other	 marriages)	 is	 in	 itself	 insulting	 and	
unjustifiably	discriminatory.	
Possibly	 the	strongest	argument	put	 forward	by	 the	CGB	in	 the	second	
conscientious	objection	case,	is	simply	that	the	officials’	freedom	of	religion	
should	 be	 balanced	 against	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 same-sex	 couple	 and	 that	 the	
latter	 rights	 should	 take	 precedence	 because	 they	 are	 explicitly	 protected	
by	 law.	Although	 rights	 to	 hold	 opinions	 or	 belief	 are	 also	 protected,	 rights	
to	 put	 religious	 and	 other	 opinions	 into	 practice	 are	generally	 limited	by	other	
fundamental	rights.146	When	the	conduct	of	marriage	officers	is	ascribed	to	the	
145	 	Decision	No	2006-51	(2006),	(CGB),	online:	<http://www.cgb.nl/oordelen/oordeel/213922/volledig>.
146	 	For	 instance,	 in	 the	South	African	Constitution	 the	right	 to	hold	 religious	and	other	beliefs	 (s	15(1))	 is	
subject	only	to	the	general	limitations	clause	(s	36),	but	rights	to	practise	religion	(s	31(1))	are	explicitly	
qualified	and	“may	not	be	exercised	in	a	manner	inconsistent	with	any	provision	of	the	Bill	of	Rights”	
(s	 31(2)).	 See	 Bruce	 MacDougall	 &	 Donn	 Short,	 “Religion-Based	 Claims	 for	 Impinging	 on	 Queer	
Citizenship”	(2010)	33:2	Dal	LJ	133.
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government,	they	may	not	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.147	
Furthermore,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 must	 maintain	 a	
discrimination	free	environment.	If	governments	accommodate	staff	members	
who	 hold	 discriminatory	 opinions,	 other	 gay	 and	 straight	 government	
employees	are	 repeatedly	 confronted	by	expressions	of	 that	discriminatory	
opinion,	as	shown	in	the	Ladele	litigation	in	the	UK.	
Most	directly	in	issue	for	many	are	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	same-




















sex	 couples,	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 those	who	argue	 for	 the	 right	 to	 live	 in	
accordance	with	one’s	faith	on	the	other	hand.	There	is	the	additional	issue	
that	governments	which	allow	objections	on	one	basis	must	also	consider	the	
rights	 of	 those	people	who	would	want	 to	 object	 on	 other	 bases.	 In	 South	
Africa	and	Scotland,	the	only	basis	upon	which	marriage	officers	can	object	
is	 the	sexual	orientation	of	 the	couple.	 In	contrast,	both	 in	 the	Netherlands	
and	 Canada	 (specifically,	 in	 Prince	 Edward	 Island,	 and	 in	 the	 proposed	
Saskatchewan	 legislation	 discussed	 above),	 religious	 objections	 on	 other	
147	 	Saskatchewan	Marriage	Reference,	supra	note	58	at	para	97.











The	 other	 –	 and	 clearly,	 related	 –	 perspective	 on	 the	 problem	 focuses	
more	on	 the	duty	 to	accommodate	 than	on	 the	hierarchy	of	discrimination	
protections.	 The	 arguments	 here	 are	 centred	 around	 the	 employer’s	 duty	
to	 provide	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disabilities,	 pregnancy,	 disease,	
language,	and	so	forth.	The	question	then	becomes	whether	an	employee	may	




competing	 rights	 and	 interests.	 The	first	 consideration	 concerns	 the	nature	
and	the	importance	of	the	right	which	has	been	limited	–	in	these	cases	the	
right	 to	practise	religion.	 Included	within	this	 factor	 is	also	a	consideration	
of	the	nature	and	history	of	the	group	whose	religious	or	cultural	rights	have	
been	affected.	Smaller	and	less	influential	groups	may	be	in	special	need	of	
constitutional	 protection.	 The	 second	 leg	 of	 the	 inquiry	 asks	 whether	 the	
legislation	or	legal	rule	functioning	to	limit	the	right	to	put	religious	beliefs	into	










have	 been	 historically	 marginalized,	 largely	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 socially	 and	
economically	powerful	religious	institutions.	In	at	least	three	of	the	jurisdictions	
151	 	Supra	note	58	at	para	25.
152	 	See	Christian	Education	South	Africa	 v	Minister	 of	Education,	 [2000]	ZACC	11;	 2000	 (4)	 SA	757	 (CC)	at	
paras	31-32;	Prince	v	President	of	the	Law	Society	of	the	Cape	of	Good	Hope,	[2002]	ZACC	1;	2002	(2)	SA	794	
(CC)	at	para	114;	MEC	for	Education:	Kwazulu-Natal	v	Pillay,	[2007]	ZACC	21;	2008	(2)	BCLR	99	(CC)	at	
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surveyed,	 same-sex	 couples	 are	 probably	 numerically	 disadvantaged	
as	 against	 members	 of	 established	 religions	 which	 disapprove	 of	 their	
relationships.153	This	disapproval	is	commonly	publicly	and	unapologetically	
vocal	in	a	way	that	is	not	accepted	for	other	discriminatory	views	and	beliefs.	








that	 religious	 objections	 to	 officiating	 same-sex	 unions	 should	 not	 be	





Since	 same-sex	 couples	 are	unable	 to	 celebrate	 their	marriages	 in	most	






Another	 fact	 to	 consider	 is	 whether	 the	 refusal	 to	 accommodate	




which	 could	 protect	 rights	 to	 religion	 without	 unduly	 infringing	 equality	
rights	of	same	sex	couples.	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 same-sex	 couples	 are	 not	 unduly	 burdened	
by	 having	 some	marriage	 officers	 refuse	 to	 serve	 them,	 but	 that	 they	will,	
at	 most,	 have	 to	 make	 “one	 or	 two”	 more	 phone	 calls	 to	 find	 somebody	
153	 	MacDougall	&	Short,	supra	note	146.
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who	will	provide	 the	service.156	This	 ignores	 the	humiliation	 inherent	 in	all	




the	proposed	 legislation	 allowing	 refusals	 to	 officiate	 “would	perpetuate	 a	
brand	 of	 discrimination	 which	 our	 national	 community	 has	 only	 recently	
begun	to	successfully	overcome.	It	would	be	a	significant	step	backward	if,	
having	won	the	difficult	fight	for	the	right	to	same-sex	civil	marriages,	gay	




The	 Netherlands	 provide	 an	 example	 where	 couples	 do	 not	 approach	




Another	 practical	 solution	 would	 be	 for	 the	 legal	 creation	 of	 either	 a	
marriage	 or	 a	 civil	 union	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 simple	 bureaucratic	 function,	
similar	to	the	registration	of	births,	deaths,	and	adoptions.	There	is	no	reason	
why	the	state	should	be	responsible,	or	even	able,	 to	provide	a	celebratory	
element	 to	what	 is	 simply	 a	 change	 of	 legal	 status.	 Parties	 should	 be	 free	
to	 celebrate	 their	 marriages	 or	 civil	 unions,	 whether	 by	 way	 of	 religious	
ceremonies	 or	 otherwise,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 coupled	 to	 the	
governmental	 function.	 Such	 a	 secularization	 of	 marriage	 would	 remove	
the	basis	 for	religious	objections,	since	marriage	officers	would	be	engaged	




of	 the	principle	of	 secularism	 in	allowing	civil	partnership	 registrations	on	
religious	premises	in	England	and	Wales159	may	be	seen	as	a	retrograde	step.
The	 benefit	 of	 viewing	 the	 problem	 from	 a	 reasonable	 accommodation	
perspective	 is	 that	 it	 creates	opportunities	 for	practical	 solutions	 to	 clashes	
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accommodation	 may	 not	 be	 the	 best	 vehicle	 for	 solving	 these	 kinds	 of	
problems	because	it	would	generally	work	in	favour	of	the	more	socially	and	
economically	dominant	parties.161
IX.    Conclusion
Within	 each	of	 the	 considered	 jurisdictions	 there	 is	great	 complexity	 in	
the	 legal,	 political,	 and	 social	 backgrounds	which	 surround	 the	 issues	 and	
resolutions	 concerning	 same-sex	 unions.	 The	 inherent	 complexity	 of	 the	
issue	combined	with	 the	differences	between	 the	approaches	 taken	 in	each	
jurisdiction	 may	 make	 it	 seem	 impossible	 to	 adapt	 solutions	 from	 one	
jurisdiction	 to	 another,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 relative	 similarities	 between	 the	
jurisdictions	vis-à-vis	their	degree	of	acceptance	of	homosexual	unions.	This	
makes	it	seem	even	more	unlikely	that	such	solutions	could	be	transported	
into	 jurisdictions	 which	 do	 not	 share	 such	 similarities.	 	 The	 existence	 of	
constitutional	 rights,	especially	whether	a	particular	 jurisdiction	recognizes	
the	 right	 not	 to	 be	 discriminated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 is	 of	
signal	 importance.	 Also	 important	 to	 the	 analysis	 are	 factors	 such	 as	 the	
way	 in	which	marriage	 is	perceived	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	generally,	 the	given	
roles	of	 civil	 servants,	 and	whether	or	not	 a	marriage	officer	 is	 considered	
part	of	the	“government”.	The	practical	political	clout	of	groups	–	in	this	case	








population	 ratios	 of	 LGBT	people	 versus	 religious	people	play	 any	 role	 in	








Rights	 in	 Family	 Law:	 The	 Perils	 of	 Multicultural	 Accommodation”	 (1998)	 6:3	 Journal	 of	 Political	
Philosophy	285.







groups	 in	 order	 to,	 if	 not	 please	 everyone,	 at	 least	 do	 the	 least	 amount	 of	
harm.	Consideration	of	the	experiences	(positive	and	negative)	of	somewhat	
similarly	situated	jurisdictions	is	a	useful	method	for	arriving	at	an	optimal	
solution	for	a	given	jurisdiction.	It	is	not	necessary	to	reinvent	the	wheel	–	not	
entirely	at	least.
